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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LAVON E. PAYNE and
ADDIE PAYNE, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

)

vs.

Case No. 14349

WALTER T. STEWART and
RUTH STEWART, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

)

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action arises out of a dispute between
the plaintiffs and defendants over a section of land.
The plaintiffs hold title by deed to a section of land
upon which defendants have historically occupied.

The

defendants also hold title by deed to a section of land
which the plaintiffs have historically occupied.

This

action arises out of the dispute over the section of land
which defendants hold title to but which plaintiffs
occupy.
Defendants also allege a right-of-way across

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this strip of land and a right to a well which lies near
the property line which divides the properties of plaintiffs
and defendants.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial judge sitting without a jury found a
boundary of acquiescence giving title to the disputed
area occupied by plaintiffs to them.

The trial judge

further ordered the defendants to remove the bridges and
a cattle guard partially located on the property in dispute.

The Court found that defendants had not establish-

ed a right-of-way over the property in dispute.

The

trial court further denied defendants an injunction
against plaintiffs1 use of the well.
NATURE OF RELEASE SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the trial court's
decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1942 plaintiffs purchased farm property in
the Benjamin area, the farm property lying to the west
of a farm belonging to Ren Stewart.

(Tr. 33, lines 22-27)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At that time there was a fence on the east side of a
strip of land on the east side of plaintiffs1 title
and the Ren Stewart farm as shown on plaintiffs1 Exhibit
No. 2, a copy of a pertinent portion of the Exhibit is
included herein as Figure "1".

(Tr. 29, lines 21-30; Tr.

30, lines 1-2; Tr. 34, lines 19-30; Tr. 35, lines 1-9;
Tr. 104, lines 12-16)

In 1942 plaintiffs occupied their

farm property and the green shaded portion on Figure "1".
At the time of the plaintiffs1 occupancy plaintiffs occupied
the green shaded portion on Figure "1" and the defendants
occupied the pink shaded portion on Figure "1" and have
so occupied the respective areas since that time. The
survey shows that the title by deed to the green shaded
portion is in defendants as successors in interest to Ren
Stewart and the title to the pink shaded portion is in the
plaintiffs.
1-8)

(Ex. 2; Tr. 71, lines 17-30; Tr. 72, lines

The green shaded portion on Exhibit No. 1 and Figure

"1" is the area to which plaintiffs claim ownership
pursuant to boundary by acquiescence.

The testimony of

Defendant Walter Stewart indicates that fence lines running
on the west and south of the pink shaded area and the
north and east side of the green shaded area were placed
there over 75 years ago and prior to the time of any

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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survey.

(Tr. 104, lines 12-26; Tr. 19, lines 13-lb)

In

1942 the plaintiffs purchased the property witnout survey
and began occupying all of the area including the green
shaded area.

(Tr. 35, lines 5-11; Tr. 41, lines 5-8; Tr.

47, lines 16-27)

The testimony of the witnesses indicates

that the plaintiffs had exclusive possession between 1942
and 1966 when the defendants moved their residence to the
Ren Stewart farm and became the owners thereof.

This

period of twenty-four (24) years of exclusive occupancy
by plaintiffs is unrebutted.
27, lines 27-30; Tr.

(Tr. 27, lines 6-12; Tr.

28, line 4)

Witness Carl Lindstrom

testified that plaintiffs had exclusive occupancy of the
green shaded portion of the property and that no one had
made use of it except the plaintiffs, other than downstream users of irrigation water to make changes in the
water headgates.

(Tr. 27, JLines27-30; Tr. 30, lines

15-20) North of the plaintiffs1 property and west of the
defendants' property the county road is paved and the
road makes a slight bend to the west and then stops
prior to entry upon the plaintiffs1 property.

(Ex. 2) At

that point a gate is placed for entrance to the plaintiffs1
property.

That gate has been closed each year during the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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entire term since 1942 to the present. Many times during
each year and every pheasant season that gate was closed
to prevent trespass across the plaintiffs1 property.
(Tr. 9, lines 4-12; Tr. 92, lines 1-10; Tr. 178, lines
28-30; Tr. 179, lines 1-7)

The defendants had maintained

a corral for their cattle north of their house for several
years.

In 1972 the defendants moved the corral to the

south end of their property and right next to the fence
which boardered the green shaded area.
5-18)

(Tr. 49, lines

At that time, in 1972, defendants commenced travers-

ing the plaintiffs1 property and the green shaded portion
of the property to get to their corral instead of building
a road each of their house through their own fields and
property, to their own corral.

(Tr. 49, lines 19-22)

They constructed two bridges across the irrigation ditch
that runs west of and parallel to the fence on the east
side of the green shaded area.

(Tr. 49, lines 23-27;

Tr. 192, lines 24-30) This action gave rise to this
suit.
In approximately 1934 plaintiffs1 precedessor
in interest appropriated and drilled a well on plaintiffs1
property near the section line and near the north end of
the green shaded area.

(Tr. 164, lines 4-11; Tr. 165,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lines 6-11)

That well was not used for a number of years.

In 1950 the well was opened and the plaintiffs began
drawing their culinary water from the well.

(Tr. 208,

Plaintiffs also allowed defendants1 pre-

lines 9-12)

decessor in interest to draw a culinary pipeline from
the well.

In 19 56 the defendants filed an application to

drill a culinary well near their house, which application
was approved by the State Engineer in 1957.
lines 13-16)

(Tr. 207,

In 1965 plaintiffs filed a change applica-

tion to convert the 1934 well from irrigation usage to
culinary usage, which was approved by the State Engineer.
(Tr. 226, lines 1-8)

Defendants continued to draw water

from the plaintiffs1 well.

(Tr. 202, lines 8-12)

In

1969 the plaintiffs demanded that the defendants disconnect
their water pipe from plaintiffs1 well and connect to
their own culinary well.

(Tr. 185, lines 16-21; Tr. 206,

lines 14-18; Tr. 2077 lines~T7-2^6)

Defendants lodged

a protest with the State Engineer regarding plaintiffs1
use of the well.

(Tr. 206, lines 19-22; Tr. 185, lines

26-30; Tr. 186, lines 1-10)

In November, 1969, the State

Engineer informed them that they should disconnect from
the plaintiffs1 well and connect to their own culinary
well which was an approved application.

(Ex. 18; Tr. 186,

lines 11-26).

-6-
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POINT I
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT OF A BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The first three points of defendants1 brief
deal with a single question, although framed to appear
as three separate questions.

The single question being

whether or not the evidence presented to the Court supports
the Court's finding of a boundary by acquiescence.
The trial court found that the line claimed by
plaintiffs has been recognized by the parties and their
predecessors in interest as the boundary between the
properties since territorial days.

(R. 15)

Defendant

Walter Stewart testified that the fence which lies to
the west of the pink shaded area and to the east of the
green shaded area is a single continuous fence.
lines 22-29)

(Tr. 12,

Defendant Walter Stewart further admits

that this fence lying to the north and east of the green
shaded area in Figure "1" was erected some time around
the turn of the century.

(Tr. 18, lines 5-9 and 26-30;

Tr. 104, lines 12-18; Tr. 105, lines 1-5)

There is

no evidence other than that this fence has been in existence
since the turn of the century.

(Tr. 36, lines 1-13)

The

Plaintiff LaVon Payne testified that no survey was made
at the time the plaintiffs purchased the property from
their predecessors, Tuckers.

(Tr. 71, lines 27-28)
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They

also did not know about the actual title line until
years afterward.

(Tr. 38, lines 6-11)

This occurred

when Mr. Tucker took the title through court.
lines 24-30; Tr. 72, lines 1-8)

(Tr. 71,

The Plaintiff LaVon

Payne further testified that when plaintiffs bought the
property, the fences were in existence, they accepted
them and assumed that the property shaded in "green" was
theirs.

(Tr. 72, lines 1-8)

The testimony at the trial

adequately supports the findings that the fence was in
existence since territorial times and that it was accepted
by the predecessors in interest and by the parties as the
boundary line between their properties.
The circumstances of entry through plaintiffs1
gate across plaintiffs' property to get to the green
shaded area, the fact that the road only leads to the
plaintiffs1 property and has not been used according to
Mr. Lindstrom by anyone other than plaintiffs and their^
guests since 1942 until 1972, placed the factual situation
directly in line with the reasoning of the Utah decisions.
There are a number of Utah Supreme Court decisions
bearing on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

The

most recent and clear pronouncement of that is found in
Baum v. Defa, (1974) 525 P.2d 725, where the opinion of
the Supreme Court, affirmed the judgment of the same

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trial judge that tried the case now before the Court.
The Court said at page 726:
Its essence is that where there has been any
type of a recognizable physical boundary,
which has been accepted as such for a long
period of time, it should be presumed that
any dispute or disagreement over the boundary
has been reconciled in some manner.
This Court went on to define what a long period
of time is, by which the boundary by acquiescence may be
established when it continued at page 726:
. . .there is no exact period which constitutes
such 'long period of time1. However, it has
usually been related to the prescriptive period
of 20 years which was regarded at common law
as the time 'since the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary.'
Baum v. Defa, further went on to apply the rule
in a factual situation similar to that now before the
Court when in the opinion it was said at page 727:
. . . if the property on either side of
such a fence is conveyed to separate parties,
so that there comes into being separate
ownership of the tracts on either side, and the
circumstances are such that the parties
should reasonably be assumed to accept the
fence as the boundary between their properties,
then from that time on, the time during which
the fence continues to exist, should be
regarded as going toward fulfilling the time
requirement for the establishment of a
boundary by acquiescence.
The evidence is uncontroverted that from 1942 when
plaintiffs purchased and occupied their land, until 1966, a
period of some 24 years, the circumstances were such that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the parties could reasonably be assumed to accept the
fence as the boundary.

It was not until 1972, when the

defendants herein attempted to cross and make use of the
green shaded area, that a dispute arose.
Thus, this fence and the occupancy of the pink
shaded area by defendants and their predecessors and the
occupancy of the green shaded area by the plaintiffs and
their predecessors fall squarely in line with the reasoning
and the factual circumstances of Baum v. Defa.
Going back to some of the earlier cases that
shed light on the particular fact situation in the case
before the Court, we find in Holmes v. Judge, (1906), 31
Utah 269, 87 Pac.

1009, the Court said at page 277:

It is squarely held, however, that long
acquiescence in a boundary that is visibly
marked, or placed where it can be and is
observed by the adjoining owner, is sufficient
to establish a boundary from which neither
party may depart at will.
The decision in Baum v. Defa really clarified
what had been previously announced by the Holmes case.
In Young v. Hyland, (1910), 37 Utah 229, 108
Pac. 1124, the Court clarified that where a fence line or
other monument had been placed in before official surveys,
that nevertheless would constitute the boundary where it
had been acquiesced in for a long period of time saying
at page 234:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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. . . where the owners of adjoining lands
occupy their respective premises up to a
certain line which they recognized and
acquiesced in as their boundary line for
a long period of time, they and their
grantees will not be permitted to deny that
the boundary line thus recognized is the
true line of division between their properties . . . A practical location of a
boundary line may be, and often is, agreed
upon, fixed, and established, either by an
express agreement, or by acquiescence, without
surveys. It may be so agreed to and fixed
before, as well as after, the making of an
official survey.
In 1912, in Farr Development Co. v. Thomas, et
al., (1912) 41 Utah 1, 122 Pac. 906, at page 3:
. . . all that is necessary to be, or that
can be, said by us on the question that
where owners of adjoining lands have occupied
their respective premises up to a certain line,
which they and their predecessors in interest
recognized and acquiesced in as their boundary
line for a long period of time, neither they,
nor their grantees or privies in estate, will
be permitted to deny that the boundary line
so recognized and acquired in as the true
line of division between their properties.
In Tanner v. Stratton, (1914) 44 Utah 253, 139
Pac. 940, with facts which closely parallel ours, being
the occupancy of the land up to the fence line and not
beyond, which is exactly the circumstance we have here
where plaintiffs occupy the green shaded portion up to the
fence line and do not occupy beyond the fence even though
they have legal title to the pink shaded portion occupied
by the defendants, and upon which defendants1 predecessors
built half of their house, the Court said at page 255:
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There is no direct evidence that the north
portion was built on the line with his express
consent or by agreement. But it was there
for more than twenty years, marking the
boundary line. He cultivated and occupied
up to the fence, and at no time occupied or
claimed any ground beyond it, and located
the latter portion of the fence in a direct
line with it. All this indicates, not only
a mere recognition and acquiescence in the
old fence line as and for a boundary line,
but consent as well, facts from which consent
may be implied.
In the case before the Court it is significant
that from 1942 to 1972 until the moving of the corrals by
the defendants to the rear of their property, they made
no efforts to assert or claim or attempt to make use of
the green shaded portion other than the occupation by the
respective parties, upon each side of the fence. No
altercations over this boundary occurred until 1972, a
period of some thirty (30) years after defendants purchased
the property from their predecessors, Tuckers. In
Provonsha v. Pitman, (1957),6 Utah 2d 26, 305 P.2d 486,
the Court indicated that subsequent grantees (in our case
the defendants, from their parents) could not marshal a
disagreement created at a later date to disavow the previously
established boundary by acquiescence.

As pointed out in

Lane v. Walker, (1973), 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 at
page 120:
'Acquiescence1 is more nearly synonymous
with 'indolence,' or 'consent by silence,'—
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or a knowledge that a fence or other monuments
appear to be a boundary. . . .
A physical examination of Exhibits 1 and 2
readily shows the physical boundary and the use of the
property by the respective parties.
In Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., (1973),
29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145, the Court stated at page
425:
Its essence is that where there arises a
dispute as to the boundary between properties,
and it appears that there is a recognizable
physical boundary of any character, which has
been acquiesced in as a boundary for a long
period of time, the conflict should be
conclusively presumed to have been reconciled
in some manner.
The lack of a dispute for a long period of time
is born out by the testimony of Mr. Carl Lindstrom, Plaintiff
LaVon Payne and even by Defendant Walter Stewart, himself,
who indicated that until he returned in 1966, although
he was residing in Salt Lake City, no efforts were made
to disavow the obvious and apparent boundary.
The defendants1 citation to Tripp v. Bagley,
(1928) 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912, is not appropo since no
survey had been made of the property, the title line was
not known (Tr. 19, lines 14-16; Tr. 71, lines 17-28) and
the plaintiffs testified that from the time of their
occupancy until this dispute arose, they had always

-13-
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understood the boundary to be the fence.
1-8)

(Tr. 72, lines

The evidence presented to the trial court in light

of the citations above quoted clearly support the finding
of the trial court of the boundary by acquiescence, and
in fact would impell the trial court to no other decision.
POINT II
THE ASSERTION THAT PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS ARE
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
ACCESS TO THE LAND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LAW
OR EVIDENCE AND THE RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT
THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE A
RIGHT-OF-WAY ACROSS PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS1
PROPERTY IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW
In Point IV of the defendants1 brief, defendants
contend that the plaintiffs were estopped from denying
defendants access to the green shaded area.

The defendants

are in the dubious and inconsistent position of asserting
by Points I, II and III, that they claim ownership of the
green shaded area, and then in Point IV, alleging that
they have established a right-of-way across the green
shaded area.

In order to make such assertion of an

establishment of a right-of-way, there would have to be an
acknowledgement that the property does, in fact, belong
to the plaintiffs, and proof of the required criteria for
establishment of an easement by prescription upon the
green shaded portion by defendants.

The testimony and

finding by the Court as to the use of the green shaded
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area by the defendants and their predessessors in interest,
is that their only use was by permission of the plaintiffs
and their predecessors.

Mr. Carl Lindstrom, a resident

of the area, testified that there were no bridges across
the fence line into the green area from the defendants'
property since 1936 when he moved into the area.
27, lines 11-16)

(Tr.

He also went on to testify that there

was no way in which to cross from the green area across
the fence, since there were no bridges across the irrigation canal.

(Tr. 29, lines 12-30; Tr. 30, lines 1-7)

There was also testimony that the fence was present in
1942 when plaintiffs Payne purchased the property (Tr.
34, lines 27-30; Tr. 35, lines 1-9) and that the predecessaros in interest of the defendants made no use of
this green area during the time which plaintiffs occupied
the property.

(Tr. 27, lines 27-30; Tr. 30, lines 1-4;

Tr. 38, lines 28-30; Tr. 39, line 1)
The uncontroverted testimony in the case established
that except for occasional visitors to the plaintiffs, that
no one had made use of the green area except the plaintiffs
and their predecessors in interest.
equipment down that lane.

Defendants moved no

(Tr. 27, lines 27-30; Tr. 28,

lines 1-4; Tr. 43, lines 3-16)

There was some testimony

to the effect that a Mr. Reynolds had used the lane.
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However, this was in connection with his church capacities
and was a use with plaintiffs1 permission,
3-25; Tr. 93, lines 11-20)

He was an invitee of both the

plaintiffs and the defendants.
Tr. 157, lines 3-5)

(Tr. 92, lines

(Tr. 156, lines 15-30;

Also there was some testimony that
Mr. Harris1 use, however,

a Mr. Harris used the lane.

was in connection with his water rights as he was a downstream user of the ditch and, therefore, had a right to
use the lane.

Also, Mr. Harris had a Mr. Fitzwater who

was a hired man who could use the road for access to his
ditch.

(Tr. 219, lines 7-14)

None of these usages

were in behalf of defendants and would not create any
right in them.
The case law which is pertinent is found in
a case decided in 1948, Savage v. Nielsen, (1948), 114
Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117, at page 32, which stated:
. . . A right of way by prescription
can only be attained by satisfying
certain other requirements. These
requirements may, for all practical
purposes, be included within the
three set out below, although the
cases under particular fact situations
have emphasized other subdivisions. The
three uses are: (1) Continuous; (2)
Open; and (3) Adverse under a claim of
right.
The court went on to say at page 33:
It is well established as the rule in
Utah that the prescriptive period is
twenty years as it was at the common
law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court, on testimony, very similar to the
testimony in the case now before us, cited with approval
in the Savage case from Jensen v. Gerrard, (1935), 85
Utah 41, 39 P.2d 1070 at page 1073:
A twenty-year use alone of a way is not
sufficient to establish an easement. Mere
use of a roadway opened by a landowner for
his own purposes will be presumed permissive.
An antagonistic or adverse use of a way
cannot spring from a permissive use. A
prescriptive title must be acquired adversely.
It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a
license or mere neighborly accommodation.
Adverse user is the antithesis of permissive
user. If the use is accompanied by any
recognition in express terms or by implication
of a right in the landowner to stop such use
now or at some time in the future, the use
is not adverse. (Emphasis suppliedj
As stated in Zollinger v. Frank, (1946) 110
Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714 at page 517:
Regardless of the words used to characterize this element of the nature of
the use necessary to give rise to a prescriptive easement, it is our opinion that the
courts mean that the use must be against the
owner as distinguished from under the
owner.
The evidence and the finding of the Court was that all usage was
permissive.
As stated in Chournos v. Alkema, (1972), 27
Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d 950, the Court said at page 248:
One cannot claim a right of way as a private
one by showing that it has been used by
the public; he must show user by himself or
by his predecessors of the way to his own
lot.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Therefore, the evidence attempted to be utilized
by the defendants herein to show that others, such as Harris
or Reynolds, use of the right-of-way would not establish
any right in the defendants.

As stated in Nielson v.

Sandberg, (1943), 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696, at page
101:
An easement, being a burden upon the
land which it traverses is limited to
uses for which, or by which it was
acquired, and to the person who acquired
it, or for the benefit of the property
for which it was acquired. Said the
Washington Court in Lund v. Johnson,
162 Wash. 525, 298 Pac. 702, 704:
. . .'The party claiming the right must
show that he has acquired it by his own
use independent of others; he cannot
make his right depend in any degree
upon the enjoyment of a similar right
by others.' Jones on Easements, Par.
273; Cox v. Forrest, 60 Md. 74; Dodge
v. Stacy, 39 Vt. 558.
The evidence in this case is that the only use
by the defendants or people acting in their behalf was a
permissive use, such visitors constituted church authorities
and other visitors and family members at family reunions
that were allowed onto the property.

(Tr. 92, Tr. 93)

While it is true that Mr. Walter T. Stewart, Jr. stated
he had used the green shaded area (Tr. 137, lines 9-14),
this had only been within the last seven (7) years and
is not sufficient to acquire a prescriptive right, being
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less than twenty (20) years.
Another of the uncontroverted facts is that
plaintiffs closed the lane area with a gate at least
every pheasant season and approximately ten (10) times
per year.

(Tr. 92, lines 3-11)

This was substantiated

by the Defendant Ruth Stewart when she stated that
the gate was always closed during pheasant season.

(Tr.

178, lines 28-30 and Tr. 179, lines 1-7).
The testimony of Defendant Ruth Stewart, herself,
supported by the testimony of Plaintiff LaVon Payne shows
that the right-of-way could never be established where the
way had been closed off several times of every year by the
plaintiffs since their occupancy in 1942.
The evidence presented to the trial court as
applied to the law shows that the finding and ruling of
the Court is in conformity with the law on establishment
of right-of-way by prescription and that the defendants
failed in their burden of proof on this point in their
counterclaim.
POINT III
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
HAD FAILED IN THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM
REQUESTING AN INJUNCTION AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
USE OF WELL
The well was first applied for in 1934 according to
defendants' own statement.

Defendants had knowledge of
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plaintiffs1 usage from the well commencing in 1950.
208, lines 9-30)
plaintiffs' well.

(Tr.

Defendants were also using water from the
Defendants prepared an agreement and sub-

mitted it to plaintiffs for usage of water from plaintiffs1
well, but plaintiffs refused to sign the agreement prepared by defendants.

(Tr. 203, lines 1-5)

Defendants

filed their own application number 28237 for a well for
water for their own culinary use in 1956, at a time when
they were using a water line from plaintiffs1 well under
a license from plaintiffs.

(Tr. 202, lines 8-30)

application was approved in 1957.

This

(Tr. 107, lines 3-16,

Ex. 18) In 1965, plaintiffs filed a change application to
convert their well claim number 5309 from irrigation to
culinary, which was approved by the State Engineer.

In

1969, the defendants initiated a protest with the State
Engineer.

As a result of that protest, the defendants re-

ceived a letter (Ex. 18) from the State Engineer informing
them that they should connect to their own well under
appropriated and approved application number 28237, as
they had no rights in plaintiffs' well.

The defendants

claims regarding the use by plaintiffs of the well should
have been acted upon pursuant to Title 73, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.

The trial court went into

this matter specifically and concluded that these water
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rights had been used for some twenty-five (25) years and
the defendants1 claim to a right to injunctive relief
against the usage of the well had long since been barred
by the statute of limitations.
202, line 1)

(Tr. 201, lines 7-30; Tr.

The defendants are in the inconsistent

position of having made use of the water from 1950 to
1970 under a license from the plaintiffs and now claim
to the Court that there has been an abandonment of this
water right.

If in fact there had been an abandonment of

water rights, the water would have been available for
appropriation and an application to the State Engineer
for appropriation would have brought the matter before
the State Engineer for decision pursuant to the procedures
outlined in Title 73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The defendants1 failure to pursue their rights
under Title 73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
with plaintiffs' continuous usage of the well since 1950,
bars their claim for an injunction.
Any claim of defendants herein to have the
Court grant an injunction has long since been barred by the
statute of limitations and the trial court correctly
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction or a legal basis
on which to act upon the counterclaim asking for
injunction.
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CONCLUSION
The record (tried to the Court as both the
trier of the fact and the law) discloses that the
determination by the Court is well supported by not
only plaintiffs' evidence, but by the admissions of the
defendants of the establishment of the boundary by
acquiescence.

The trial court ruled correctly in light

of all Utah Supreme Court cases that plaintiffs had
established their burden of proof and had ownership of
the disputed green shaded area by boundary by acquiescence,
The defendants failed to establish proof of the
necessary criteria that they had established an easement
by prescription over the plaintiffs' property.

Defendants

failed in their burden of proof to establish any basis
upon which the Court would have jurisdiction for or the
right to grant their request for an injunction against
the plaintiffs' use of the well.
The Court should affirm the trial court in all
points in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
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